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A formal plan to evaluate the success of hazardous materials emergency response 
teams did not exist at Eau Claire Fire Rescue.  Problems with its own response team 
caused this agency to question whether team structure and makeup changes might 
enhance program success. 
 The purpose of the research was to evaluate structure and configuration 
components of  hazardous materials response teams in the Midwest, with results to yield 
agency recommendations. The study used evaluative research methodology to answer the 
following: 
1.  In evaluating success criteria for hazardous materials emergency response teams in 
the Midwest, what impact do the following factors have on success? 
a.  geographical response boundaries. 
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b.  population served. 
c.  career, volunteer, or combination team structure. 
d.  the number of technicians. 
e.  member orientation (fire service, law enforcement, private sector). 
f.  single organization vs. multiple organization teams. 
g.  how long the team has been in existence. 
h.  who manages/coordinates the team. 
2.  For Midwest hazardous materials emergency response teams that provide service 
outside their normal jurisdiction, how is legal authority obtained? 
3.  How are Midwest hazardous materials emergency response teams funded? 
 A literature search was conducted and a 40-question survey was developed.  The 
purpose of the survey was to delineate eight components of team structure and to 
numerically score respondents in seven success criteria.  The survey was mailed to 150 
haz-mat teams in nine midwestern states.  One hundred and fourteen responded, 
providing a confidence level of at least 95%.  Results were arranged for analysis using 
interval scales.  An arithmetic mean was established to allow variance and standard 
deviation calculations.    
The data revealed favorable success scores for certain team structure components.  
Each of the following were considered favorable on an interval scale analysis using the 
seven success criteria: being industry based, serving a large population, having career 
members, having more than 76 technicians, having all members from one organization, 
and having a team that has been in existence for 11 years and over.   
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From the research, agency recommendations were formulated.  A 1.04 standard 
deviation in the local agency program evaluation and enduring problems with leadership 
and cost sharing led to the following recommendations: 
1.  Create a regional response team.  Negotiate service agreements with adjoining 
counties.  
2.  Restrict team membership to Eau Claire Fire Rescue  personnel only. 
3.  Redirect management/coordination responsibilities to the Eau Claire Fire 
Chief. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background and Significance 
As required by provisions of the Superfund Reauthorization Act of 1986, the Eau 
Claire County Local Emergency Planning Committee submitted a hazardous materials 
response plan on October 4, 1988.  There are two issues in the plan that have created 
controversy to this day and give substance to my research.  The first has to do with 
designating an incident commander at hazardous materials emergencies. 
According to the plan, the senior first responding officer (which in some cases 
may be a law enforcement officer) will become the incident commander.  The exception 
to the rule is if the spill or release occurs within the municipal boundaries of the City of 
Eau Claire, the senior fire official becomes the incident commander.  Additional 
background information involving local experience with the incident command system 
centers around the fire districts in Eau Claire County and their first in the Interstate 94 
mutual aid agreement.  Both the written agreement and the organization’s reputation for 
smooth integration of mutual aid companies have served as benchmark examples for the 
fire service in Wisconsin.  Law enforcement typically does not have a comfortable 
working knowledge of the incident command system.  As a result, their on-scene role is 
largely support along with traffic and pedestrian control.  What’s evolved is a system 
whereby the fire officers routinely establish command and manage the incident to its 
conclusion. 
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Fifteen members are elected to an Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) 
which provides operational oversight for the program.  The Local  Emergency Planning 
Committee do not provide any leadership for the team and the group is frequently left to 
struggle, sometimes awkwardly on its own.  Given the team’s complex mixture of career 
and volunteer mix from public and private sector jobs, management and leadership 
challenges are considerable.  Guidance and direction have been missing. 
The Eau Claire Fire Rescue is the only career fire department in Eau Claire 
County.  Of its 94 members, 84 are hazardous materials technicians or specialists that 
belong to the county Level “B” team.  The regional response Level “A” team currently 
has 40 technicians and respond to Level “A” incidents in 16 counties in west-central 
Wisconsin.  
Since the county Level “B” team was formed in 1988, there have been ongoing 
problems with member retention, providing and maintaining requisite training, record 
keeping, and equitable cost sharing.  A failure to resolve has become more apparent with 
the team’s desire to extend coverage to adjoining counties.  A failure of quality 
leadership has nearly made this an impossible goal. 
Increasingly, questions about team structure, team makeup, and who or what 
agency should manage the team have surfaced.  For this department, a method to evaluate 
the different configurations of Midwest hazardous materials response teams against 
prescribed goals and objectives was needed.  That information could provide answers to 
our questions.  The pursuit of those answers was the purpose of this research.  The 
National Fire Academy’s Strategic Management of Change class (S.M.O.C.) provided 
the necessary tools.  The major component of S.M.O.C. was the change management 
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model, a four-part process involving analysis, planning, implementation, and 
evaluation/institutionalize.  The evaluation phase of the change management model 
provided the outline for this research.      
Problem Statement  
 A formal plan to analyze and evaluate the success of hazardous materials 
emergency response teams did not exist at Eau Claire Fire Rescue.  This 94 member 
career fire department provides Level “A” response, as defined by National Fire 
Protection Agency (NFPA) 471.  The department also participates in a county-wide 
Level “B” response team controlled by the Eau Claire County’s Division of Emergency 
Management.  The county team includes private and public sector members and responds 
to Level “B” spills within the county.  Problems with volunteer retention, training, cost 
equity, and discordance cause this agency to question whether team structure and makeup 
changes might enhance program success. 
Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this research was to evaluate structure and configuration 
components of Level “B” hazardous materials response teams in the Midwest.  The 
results would yield improvement recommendations. 
Research Methodology 
 The study uses evaluative research methodology to answer the following 
questions: 
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1.  In evaluating success criteria for hazardous materials emergency response teams in 
the Midwest, what impact do the following factors have on success? 
a.  geographical response boundaries. 
b.  population served. 
c.  career, volunteer, or combination team structure. 
d.  the number of technicians. 
e.  member orientation (fire service, law enforcement, private sector). 
f.  single organization vs. multiple organization teams. 
g.  how long the team has been in existence. 
h.  who manages/coordinates the team. 
2.  For Midwest hazardous materials emergency response teams that provide service 
outside their normal jurisdiction, how is legal authority obtained? 
3.  How are Midwest hazardous materials emergency response teams funded? 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The purpose of the literature review is to examine excerpts and thoughts of others 
that have published materials on hazardous materials emergency response teams.  The 
review will demonstrate how literature affected the results. 
The Problem 
 According to the Department of Transportation (DOT), more than 575,000 
chemical products are produced in over 11,000 chemical plants in the U.S.  But are all 
chemical products hazardous materials?  The DOT defines hazardous materials as: 
“substances or materials capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, 
property, and the environment when transported in commerce (Kales, Castro, and 
Christiani, 1996, p. 394).”  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) divides them 
into four categories:  extremely hazardous substances, hazardous substances, hazardous 
chemicals, and toxic chemicals.  They range from the familiar to the bizarre, from 
chlorine gas to gasoline, to organophosphate pesticides, and hydrofluoric acid (EPA, 
1988).   
 The Congressional Research Service estimates approximately 75% of Americans 
live in the vicinity of plants that produce, handle, treat, or store hazardous materials.  
Approximately 4 billion tons of regulated hazardous materials are transported each year 
throughout the United States.  The DOT estimates there are about 500,000 hazardous 
materials shipments per day, or 183 million shipments per year (FEMA, 1993).  The 
majority of hazardous materials are manufactured, stored, and transported safely.  But 
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because the potential for disaster is so great, the need for safe handling, storage, 
transportation, and emergency mitigation is paramount.  The deaths of six Kansas City 
firefighters when 45,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate/fuel oil exploded in November, 
1988, clearly focused national attention on the dangers emergency responders face where 
hazardous materials are present (U.S. Fire Administration, 1988).     
An Evolution of Concern 
 Twenty-five years ago, most of the federal, state, and local laws and regulations 
that address hazardous materials safety issues did not exist.  In the wake of several major 
environmental incidents, Congress has mandated certain levels of preparedness and 
training for response personnel.  Not being prepared could be cause for a very unpleasant 
experience.  That experience could include monetary penalties, costs associated with 
bringing an operation into compliance, legal settlements, unnecessary environmental 
damage, personal injury, or even death (McMahon, 1998).  “Whether or not you’re 
prepared for them, hazardous materials are a fact of life, and the local fire department is 
going to be the first one summoned to deal with the problem (Birt, 1997, p. 24).”   
Clean-up the Environment 
 The 1980s saw a significant increase in public awareness about hazardous waste.  
Numerous federal, state, and local laws were enacted to address what seemed to be a 
changing and growing problem.  The country first began to hear and learn about 
unregulated disposal of hazardous waste with news of contamination of the Niagara Falls, 
New York, neighborhood of Love Canal.  Congress followed by passing the 
Comprehensive Emergency Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 
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1980.  The so-called “Superfund” program allocated $1.5 billion to clean up hazardous 
materials spills and compensate state and local governments for their part in clean-up 
activities (National Governors’ Association, Undated).  By 1985, the notion that 
hazardous materials were confined to a few isolated locations had been dispelled.  
Congress was now estimating that there were as many as 10,000 sites across the country 
needing clean-up and that projected costs for such work exceeded $100 billion (EPA, 
1988). 
 Attention was also focused on the problems associated with the transport of 
hazardous materials.  In 1971, the Chemical Manufacturers Association established the 
Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC) to provide information to 
emergency responders (Moyer and Francis, 1994).  Fire departments were becoming 
more and more aware of not only the potential hazards involved, but also the technical 
skills and safety measures required to effectively mitigate a hazardous materials incident.  
During the 1980s, many fire departments began to develop their hazardous materials 
response capabilities (Browne, 1991).  
Rules and Regulations 
 The Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) 1975, brought 
responsibilities previously delegated to other agencies under the control of the 
Department of Transportation.  The act defined regulated materials, authorized the 
regulation of labeling and placarding of packages and containers, and preempted 
conflicting state laws.  Certain aspects of the legislation were expanded and built upon in 
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1990 with the passage of (HMTUSA) the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform 
Safety Act (FEMA, 1993). 
The Bhopal, India, tragedy in December of 1984, in which a cloud of methyl isocyanate 
from a Union Carbide plant killed more than 2,500, followed eight months later by 
another accidental release at the Union Carbide plant in Institute, West Virginia, led 
officials to pass the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in 1986.  
The Union Carbide events brought into focus how little information the public had on 
hazardous substances in their communities and on the inadequacies of emergency 
response (Moyer and Francis, 1994). 
 SARA was primarily an expansion of the Superfund clean-up program.  Two 
sections of the act provided new direction: Title I stipulated training requirements for 
emergency responders and Title III contained a new authorization, the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) designed to require community-
wide planning for chemical emergencies. Title I linked skill requirements for first 
responders with an escalating level of functions to be performed.  The standard 
established five levels of hazardous materials training: awareness, operational, 
technician, specialist, and on-scene incident commander.  Title III authorized the 
appropriation of funds to be used for emergency preparedness programs, including 
training for hazardous materials incidents (Fire, 1990).  Title III also established a new 
framework for improved community awareness and notification.  The act required state 
and local emergency planning commissions (SERCs & LEPCs) be created to supervise 
and coordinate the development of local emergency response plans (FEMA, 1993).  
According to FEMA, “These regulations cannot prevent hazardous materials incidents.  
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They should, however, help provide the means of notifying the public of potential 
hazards and to help emergency planners and responders effectively manage potentially 
dangerous situations (FEMA, 1993, p. 9).”   
Most injuries to emergency personnel occur during the first minutes of the 
incident response, before the full scope of the incident and its attendant dangers have 
been appreciated.  A potential weakness of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration Hazardous Waste and Emergency Response Standard (1910.120) is that 
its scope appears to exclude employees working in the immediate release area and their 
activities in relation to incidental releases of hazardous substances (Kales, Castro, and 
Christiani, 1996, p. 399).        
 “The days of the dramatic derailment or chemical release are going to become 
less prevalent as industry specific regulations are developed and enforced (Kurzeja, 1995, 
p.29).”  Just as EMS has evolved in the fire service, hazardous materials teams must be 
prepared to meet the challenges of environmental protection.  “Our involvement will 
likely take us beyond life safety and incident stabilization to include prevention as well 
as start-to-finish incident mitigation (Kurzeja, 1995, p.31).”  
 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has moved forward on its mandate 
from Congress under the Clean Air Act.  Specifically, the Risk Management Planning 
(RMP) portion of the legislation is complete and according to its terms, facilities must 
now identify the worst case scenario for each site.  Many in industry feel the focus of 
planning should not be on the worst case scenario, but rather on the most probable 
scenario (Callan, 1994).  The RMP will help make local emergency plans more 
comprehensive and reliable.  On the preventive end, a chemical investigation board has 
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been established under the Clean Air Act.  The board will investigate accidents in order 
to establish corrective measures to minimize future accidents (Callan, 1994). 
 Another piece of legislation destined to have an impact is the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) Reform Act.  The purpose of the act is to bring up to 
date many OSHA programs, some of which have not been changed since the first OSHA 
Act in 1970.  One piece of the legislation seeks to hold the supervisor or manager directly 
responsible for the death or serious injury of a subordinate during an emergency 
response.  The act specifically details that, “The supervisor shall not be protected by the 
organization.  The organization cannot pay for the defense, and, if found guilty, the 
supervisor, not the employer, must pay the damages (Callan, 1994, p. 20).” 
Training 
 Training is a major consideration when addressing emergency preparedness for 
hazardous materials emergencies.  Title I of SARA establishes minimum training 
standards for emergency responders.  Responders are required to complete training based 
on the duties and functions they are to perform.  The requirements are stated in terms of 
minimum hours of training and in terms of demonstrated competencies (OSHA, 1989).  
The content of the training is not specified.  The five categories identified are: 
1)  Awareness.  Trained to initiate an emergency response sequence by notifying the 
proper authorities.  They would take no further action beyond notification. 
2)  Operations.  Trained to respond in a defensive fashion without actually trying to 
stop the release.  Their function is to contain the release from a safe distance, 
keep it from spreading, and prevent exposures. 
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3)  Technician.  Assume a more aggressive role.  They will approach the point of 
release in order to plug, patch, or otherwise stop the release of a hazardous 
substance. 
4)  Specialist.  Their duties parallel those of the technician; however, those duties 
require a more directed or specific knowledge of the various substances they may 
be called upon to contain. 
5)  Incident commander.  Will assume control of the incident scene (OSHA, 1989).   
These levels are built on the premise that emergency responders must build on previous 
levels of competency as they progress (Brown, 1998).   
Response teams that utilize personnel from various agencies face a difficult task 
in acquiring the necessary training.  Integrating personnel from many different 
emergency response agencies and private industry into a cohesive haz-mat response team 
presents numerous challenges, not the least of which is requisite training.  Some 
obstacles include: getting time off to attend, assuring appropriate quality and conformity, 
and the issue of who pays the bill  (Brown, 1993).  Remember, “Training doesn’t always 
mean learning.  Be able to prove your responders are competent by keeping complete and 
accurate training records (McMahon, 1996, p. 4).”  “Remember too, haz-mat incidents 
are materials driven.  The more materials on-site, the broader the spectrum of training 
required to safely handle the incident (Browne, 1997, p. 25).” 
Emergency Response 
 “Many small fire departments can afford the luxury of simply securing a haz-mat 
scene, conducting isolation and evacuation, and awaiting the arrival of trained industry 
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specialists to resolve the incident (Hermann, 1993, p. 42).”  In contrast, larger 
departments serving more populated areas that present significant exposure hazards, and 
a higher expectation of service demand incident mitigation by specialized haz-mat teams 
(Hermann, 1993).  
 In Wisconsin, the past decade has produced the following hazardous materials 
response changes for the Wisconsin fire service: a 28% increase in awareness level 
response capability, a 50% increase in operations level response capability, and a 41% 
increase in technician level response capability.  And over the same time period, 
hazardous materials responses have doubled (Comito, 1997). 
Funding 
 A major benefit of regional response teams is the ability to share costs.  
Departments are able to eliminate duplication of equipment and share in the purchase of 
new equipment.  The Lake County Haz-Mat Response Team consists of 45 fire 
departments serving a population of 700,000, about 20 miles north of Chicago.  Their 
response area covers approximately 1,000 square miles.  Since its inception in 1985, the 
cooperative agreement has kept costs to a minimum.  Each department has contributed 
only $7,500 to date (Cashman, 1994). 
 In Tarrant County, Texas, an 11-city fire mutual aid agreement was the precursor 
to the creation of the Northeast Hazardous Materials Response Team.  A significant 
motivation in creating the team was a desire to provide, “A high caliber, well-equipped 
response to incidents involving hazardous materials, without increasing taxpayer 
burdens.  Member cities currently pay $2,500 annually (Erwin, 1993, p. 19).”   
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 Division of labor and cost sharing in Franklin County, Ohio, gave way to this 
unique response arrangement. 
The regional team consists of an airwagon and a special haz-mat medic unit from 
Perry Township, suit teams from Sharwood and Washington, a ladder company 
from Norwich that is responsible for decon and diking, a ladder company from 
Upper Arlington that is cross-trained in decon and diking, and an engine company 
from Grandview Heights that tows a foam trailer (Cashman, 1994, p.64).   
 Many regional response teams have enacted legislation to allow billing back the 
responsible party.  Such arrangements make operating expenses recoverable, but require 
accurate record keeping.  Other regional teams benefit from state funds to help finance 
their teams (Cramer, 1995).  Like Oregon and New Jersey, the Commonwealth of 
Virginia provides funding for 19 locally based Hazardous Materials Response Teams 
(HMRTs) (Cashman, 1994).  The regional response team in Cumberland County, 
Pennsylvania, is made up of four volunteer fire companies that maintain their own 
equipment, insurance and vehicles.  The team does not receive county funds.  It’s only 
outside funding comes from proceeds generated by equipment costs billed to the spiller 
(Cashman, 1994). 
 The haz-mat team in Pinellas Park, Florida, took advantage of a little known state 
tax on gross receipts of commercial hazardous waste facilities.  By amending a local 
ordinance and making proper application for the tax revenue, Pinellas Park has been able 
to reimburse the general fund for overtime and training costs incurred during the past five 
years.  A heavy rescue truck for use by the haz-mat team, air quality monitoring devices, 
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and several SCBA units have been purchased through this unique funding source 
(Cramer, 1995).   
 A Southern California regional response team found that together they could 
accomplish more than anyone could alone.  Due in part to its multi-agency approach, it 
was awarded a State of California grant for upgrading equipment.  In 1995, its ruling 
commission decided the fortuitous and much heralded team approach show be allowed to 
grow.  Today the team responds to multi-causality incidents, urban search and rescue 
needs, and confined space emergencies (Bryan, 1996). 
 In the Dayton, Ohio, area, 37 participating departments joined forces to create a 
regional response team.  Participating jurisdictions pay an annual per capita fee, and a 
buy-in fee equal to one-tenth of one percent of the jurisdiction’s property value.  The fees 
cover equipment purchases, training, and other costs (Birt, 1992).  According to Chief 
Wright of the participating Greenville Fire Department, “The cost of initiating a haz-mat 
team can be an expensive endeavor, but failing to organize a system at all can be even 
more expensive (Birt, 1992, p. 23).”        
Regional Response Teams 
 After six years of lobbying and debate that included the possibility of not 
responding to haz-mat incidents at all, the Oregon legislature approved a program that 
established designated regional response teams.  By the end of 1992, Oregon had 
established ten regional response teams to provide a uniform level of haz-mat response 
coverage to the entire state (Birr, 1992).  The intent of the program is “to provide 
advanced, OSHA haz-mat technician level service at major incidents throughout the 
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state.  The regional teams are not intended for haz-mat cleanup or disposal, nor for the 
simple standbys (Birr, 1992, p. 43).”  In return, the ten fire department based teams 
receive equipment and training from the state for agreeing to respond out of their 
jurisdiction.  The Oregon program was borne out of a frustration with an increasing 
number of incidents and the elevated pressure from OSHA requiring more training and 
better equipment for the responders (Garza, 1992).   
 A number of regional configurations have formed across the county around which 
to organize haz-mat response teams (HMRTs).  Their presence seems to be borne out of 
the desire to provide cost effective emergency response.  According to Rick Emery, 
coordinator of the Lake County HMRT,  
There are all kinds of people trying to form their own HMRTs, even though their 
own agency does not have a justifiable need for such an expense.  Each 
department cannot spend the time or money to form a team.  They need to band 
together into a regional response team, or the state needs to divide the area by 
regional teams and fund them with HMTUSA (Federal Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990) monies (Cashman, 1994, p. 64).  
Regional response teams are now staffed, controlled, and paid for by fire departments in 
diversified geographical areas.  The attraction of pooling existing resources to form 
HMRTs are creating formal, written resolutions of agreement across the country.  
Cashman points to success stories in Lake County, Illinois; Franklin County, Ohio; 
Sedalia-Pettis County, Missouri; Hamilton Township, New Jersey; Fredericksburg, 
Virginia; Cumberland County, Pennsylvania; and the Fort Worth metropolitan area of 
Texas, as benchmark examples.  He concludes his article by saying, 
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The evolution of regional hazardous materials response teams has provided fire 
departments with a reasonable, practical, and cost-effective solution to haz-mat 
response.  In addition to providing team members with greater access to needed 
equipment, more buying power, and increased training, HMRTs offer the most 
essential element of all, increased safety to their members (Cashman, 1994, p. 
66).      
 In the San Francisco Bay Area, a multi-jurisdiction haz-mat team serving a 
population of 222,000 in a three city area, has given way to a promising future based on 
the cooperation between agencies.  “Cooperation to create what’s best for the public and 
our departments (Garza, 1992, p.21).”  Success and cooperation in managing the 
Northeast Hazardous Materials Response Team in Texas led that authority to add 
explosives response to their menu of services (Erwin, 1993).  
 Two cities south of Los Angeles with heavy industry decided they could work 
together as a haz-mat team despite the fact the two jurisdictions aren’t contiguous.  Santa 
Fe Springs and Vernon, California, fire chiefs state, “Some problems will be minor or 
small, but even these must be handled correctly to avoid escalation into a more serious 
situation (Schnabel and Telford, 1995, p. 36).”   
Emergency Planning 
A community’s ability to cope with a potential emergency depends on its ability 
to plan for and respond to that incident (Moyer and Francis, 1995).   
The intention of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA) was to ensure that planning for chemical emergencies occurred at the 
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local level.  Local elected officials and response professionals are in a unique 
position to gauge the risk presented to a community by the presence of hazardous 
chemicals (FEMA, 1993, p. 30).   
One weakness of Title III local planning requirements relates more to the diverse types of 
local government it is trying to address.  The idea is that a strong, centralized government 
entity, one that provides the majority of public services, including police and fire, will 
stand a better chance of producing a realistic response plan (Callan, 1994).  When a 
strong centralized county government does not exist, “There is a natural tendency toward 
independence, particularly in the absence of controlling authority.  To exchange, share, 
and coordinate information across the multiplicity of independent fire and police 
departments without any real authority requires time, effort, energy, and patience 
(FEMA, 1993, pp. 30 & 31).”  In such cases, response plans may satisfy administrative 
requirements only. 
Summary 
 Several pieces of federal legislation have and will continue to provide the driving 
force to hazardous materials emergency response.  This review has not provided an 
exhaustive examination of those laws and requirements, but rather an abbreviated 
historical glimpse of how and why they have evolved.  Local governments and 
emergency responders are constantly working to comply with these regulations in order 
to provide safe and effective emergency response. 
 Mandatory training and expensive equipment are two major challenges facing 
response agencies.  Equipment and manpower sharing in the form of regional response 
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teams that eliminate duplication and maximize available resources is a solution that can 
work.  The review provided a brief glimpse at several successful regional teams.   
 Federal legislation has indeed focused state and local attention on the hazardous 
materials problems they face.  The awareness and additional information they’ve 
provided has helped some jurisdictions to better prepare themselves.  Sometimes the 
information leads to little more than a paper response to an administrative requirement.  
Local planning should be the result of cooperative input.  Decisions are meant to be well 
reasoned, justified, and based on fact.  In a perfect world, issues of community and/or 
agency pride and turf battles would not be allowed to corrupt those decisions.  
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CHAPTER III 
PROCEDURES 
A literature review of contemporary published documents on the subject was the 
first step to completing this research.  A comprehensive search for articles was initiated 
at the National Fire Academy’s Learning Resource Center (LRC) and the University of 
Wisconsin at Stout.  A state survey and analysis of the Wisconsin fire service was 
another important part of the review.  I felt it necessary to first obtain a concept of “best 
practices” and “contemporary wisdom” on how and why hazardous materials teams are 
structured the way they are from leaders in the field.      
Next, a survey instrument was prepared, tested, and distributed  (Appendix A).  
The purpose of the survey was to provide research data necessary to answer research 
question number one.  Evaluative methodology and the survey data were used to evaluate 
the success of Midwest hazardous materials emergency response teams.  Raw data was 
placed into a Microsoft Access database program to provide sorting and analysis 
capabilities.  A staff member from the City of Eau Claire’s Information Services Office 
provided technical support in formatting the data.  
Survey questions were designed around the evaluation phase of the Change 
Management Model (Appendix B).  The Change Management Model is the framework of 
the EFOP course titled, “Strategic Management of Change.”  The Change Management 
Model exists to help bring control and direction to change chaos as it is based on a 
systematic progression to help facilitate change.  This research uses phase four of the 
model which offers a methodical approach to evaluation.  Once a program or any kind of 
change has been implemented, it must be continuously and systematically monitored to 
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make sure it is functioning as predicted.  There are seven parts of the evaluation phase.  
They include: 1)  evaluate the implementation against the initial change goals, 2)  
evaluate the implementation against the described future state, 3)  evaluate how well 
established, or institutionalized, the change becomes, 4)  evaluate how rapidly the change 
was accomplished, 5)  evaluate costs to individuals and the organization of conducting 
the change, 6)  identify costs to individuals and the organization of conducting the 
change, and 7)  assess initial resistance to change.  Thirty survey questions were used to 
assess the seven success criteria.     
The survey was conducted anonymously; however, eight questions of the 40 
question survey appraise team structure and makeup.  That information would give 
substance to the research as the success criteria responses were sorted and examined 
according to the structure and makeup of a team.  The resulting data would provide 
answers to research question number one and give cause to program recommendations.   
Questions two and three of the survey correspond to research questions two and 
three.  The questions are separate and distinct in that their sole purpose is to provide the 
answers to research questions two and three.  They are open-ended (allowing respondents 
to answer in their own words) to obtain as much information as possible.  Appendix C 
includes summary information for each of the first ten questions.      
Questions 11 - 40 were structured around closed-ended (yes/no or multiple 
choice) and forced-choice (multiple choice response which does not include “no opinion” 
or “not applicable”) responses to provide uniformity and ease of analysis.  
In order to measure and quantify success criteria data, a Likert measurement scale 
was used (Likert, 1961).  A numbered response from one to five, with 1 being “never 
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true” and 5 being “always true” gave value to the responses and provided a means to 
numerically measure results.  Four questions required distinct and special computation 
formulas in the database query due to their style.  They included: a 13 part standard 
operating procedure checklist question (#25) and three true/false questions (27, 28, 29).      
A representative sample of survey recipients was selected from a published 
directory of hazardous materials emergency response teams (Cashman, 1998).  Midwest 
response teams were the target audience.  Survey recipients included all teams listed in 
the directory for: Michigan, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, South Dakota, Illinois, 
Missouri, Kansas, and Nebraska.  A total of 150 surveys were mailed on December 3, 
1999.  According to material in the National Fire Academy’s Executive Development 
student manual, a population size of 150 requires a sample size of 108 to assure a 95% 
confidence level.  The sample obtained for this research exceeded that requirement by 
six.  A total of 114 surveys were completed and returned; therefore, confidence level 
exceeds 95 percent.   
Survey questions 11 - 19 represent the first success criteria by evaluating haz-mat 
teams against initial change goals.  The questions were taken from the OSHA hazwopper 
rule (29 CFR 1910.120).  They are clearly stated federal requirements for each and every 
haz-mat team.  They are explicit, quantifiable, and have served to guide in the 
development of all hazardous materials emergency response teams. 
Questions 20 - 27 evaluate teams against a described future state.  To assess this 
criteria, I used selected provisions from the latest editions of NFPA 471 and 472.  
“Recommended Practices for Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents,” NFPA 471 
represents a well articulated and envisioned state for haz-mat teams to aspire to.  NFPA 
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472 is titled, “Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials 
Incidents.”  Unless specifically adopted by the local authority, NFPA 471 and 472 carry 
no requirements of law, but do express a desired set of guidelines.  One question was 
included that sought to identify locally established standard operating procedures and that 
list was assembled from various articles in the literature review.   
Evaluation criteria number three looks at how well established, or 
institutionalized, the team has become.  Questions 28 - 35 provide the data for the 
analysis.  Precepts of NFPA 471 and 472 are used throughout.  This time only those 
issues related to measuring the team’s ability to sustain behaviors or activities were 
selected.  For example, does regular review of MSDS Sara Title III information take 
place?  Is there coordination with outside agencies that includes detailed resource 
information and methods for sharing?  And, is pre-planning emergency response to fixed 
site and transportation spills a routine and established activity for the team?  These are 
examples of questions used to assess how well established, or institutionalized, the team 
has become. 
The fourth criteria evaluates how rapidly the change was accomplished.  Using 
the Likert scale with 1 being slow and 5 being rapid, respondents were asked to 
characterize how quickly the change process unfolded in the formation and development 
of their team.  The question makes reference to local circumstances and a sense of 
urgency as influencing factors. 
Questions 37 and 38 quantify the costs to the organization and the individual, the 
fifth criteria.  Criteria six and seven are also direct and straight forward assessments with 
one question devoted to each criteria.  All are given numerical value by use of the Likert 
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response scale.  It is important to note that the last two criteria favor a low numbered 
response.  The first five success criteria are judged better or best with a higher numerical 
response. 
Once the surveys had been returned and data entry was complete, an assistant 
from Information Services and the researcher constructed the database queries and 
reports which became the method to measure and evaluate success criteria.  First the 
researcher developed a report that would look at the eight team makeup characteristics 
and the corresponding success criteria scores (Appendix D).   Highlighted entries from 
each category represent the best scores in that criteria.  Next, I formulated queries and 
reports to delineate success criteria for every possible combination in questions 1 through 
10.  For example, a query and report was created to yield combination success criteria for 
questions five and nine.  The report combines career, volunteer, and combination 
responses with the years in existence responses  
(0 - 3, 4- 10, 11 and over).  Reports were created for every combination to examine 
resulting success criteria.  An unofficial research question became, what combinations of 
characteristics yield favorable evaluation scores?  The combining of queries caused the 
database to swell enormously.  It currently sits at 7.33 megabytes.  It is much too large to 
print in its entirety.  An arithmetic mean was calculated to show variance and standard 
deviation calculations.  Lastly, a report was generated for Eau Claire Fire Rescue’s own 
hazardous materials response team, based on their completed survey to provide cause and 
justification for research recommendations.    
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Limitations 
 The demographic breakdown of survey respondents reveals some limitations to 
the research.  Only one hazardous materials response team is listed as responding to 
manufacturing/industrial site(s) only.  A single entity yet the resulting data received equal 
consideration in interval scales analysis for industrial, fire service, public safety, or 
public/private sector teams.  When you look at the data, you see a very favorable set of 
numbers for manufacturing/industrial teams, even though only one industrial team survey 
was returned.  
 Similarly, other demographic groups were only modestly represented in the 
research.  They included: all volunteer teams (7), combination public safety teams (7), 
teams managed/coordinated by a county sheriff or other law enforcement designee (5), 
and teams managed/coordinated by an elected board, commission, or individual (4).          
Definition of Terms 
Interval Scale  -  Ranking information based on equal units.  Gives information 
concerning the actual amount of a trait or characteristic. 
Mean  -  The arithmetic mean is commonly known as the “average.”  It is computed by 
adding all observations and dividing by the number of observations. 
Standard Deviation  -  The square root of the variance.  The most useful of the common 
measures of dispersion.  
Variance  -  The mean of the squared deviation scores about the mean of a distribution.  
To calculate, first figure the distance of each observation from the mean of all 
observations (the deviation from the mean).  Then, square each deviation, add those 
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squared deviations, and divide the sum of the squared deviations by the number of 
observations.  A small variance indicates that the data points are close to the mean. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 This section of the research answers each of the original research questions.  The 
researcher will summarize findings from the research, presenting all data used to derive 
the results.  The data is in the form of interval scales, ranking information that reflects the 
actual amount of a success criteria.  There are seven success criteria in the Change 
Management Model, thus seven columns of numbers.  The numbers reflect values for 
each success criteria expressed in an interval scale and in a two decimal numerical 
format. 
Column 1  Evaluates against initial change goals. 
Column 2  Evaluates against the described future state. 
Column 3 Evaluates how well established, or institutionalized, the program 
has become. 
Column 4  Evaluates how rapidly the program was accomplished. 
Column 5 Evaluates the costs to individuals and the organization in 
developing the team. 
Column 6 Identifies the number of unanticipated actions and occurrences 
(lower number is preferable). 
Column 7  Assesses initial resistance (lower number is preferable). 
Be mindful that the first five success criteria favor a high number and a low number is 
desired for the last two criteria.  Highlighted numbers designate the best score for each 
criteria.   
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Research Questions 
1.  In evaluating success criteria for hazardous materials emergency response teams in 
the Midwest, what impact do the following factors have on success? 
Table 1 a.  Geographical Response Boundaries 
Municipal 4.38 3.77 3.23 3.5 2.91 3.19 2.75 
Industry 4.44 4.52 4.88 4.00 4.00 3.00 1.00 
Metro 4.56 4.35 3.91 3.05 3.78 2.89 2.74 
County 4.41 4.23 3.53 2.78 3.28 3.09 2.70 
Regional 4.57 4.35 3.86 3.12 3.75 3.06 2.50 
 
Industry scored best in the geographic response issue with five of seven success criteria 
ranking best on the interval scale.  Regional and metro teams were slightly better at 
meeting initial change goals and the metro teams were slightly better at expecting the 
unexpected.   
Table 2 b.  Population Served 
< 50,000 4.36 3.93 3.54 3.12 3.33 2.84 2.68 
50 – 100 K 4.53 4.28 3.66 2.85 3.26 2.90 2.25 
100 – 500 K 4.53 4.38 3.77 3.09 3.63 3.04 2.69 
500 K - Mil 4.63 4.26 3.95 3.29 4.00 3.57 2.57 
1 Mil + 4.54 4.31 3.70 3.43 3.33 3.29 2.86 
 
There is not a clear leader in the category of population served.  Generally, those teams 
serving a population base of 500,000 and up have the best scores in the first five success 
criteria with the final two criteria, anticipating the unanticipated and resistance to change, 
best managed by the smaller populations. 
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Table 3 c. Career, Volunteer, Or Combination Team Structure 
Career 4.53 4.30 3.79 3.18 3.53 3.08 2.64 
Volunteer 4.21 3.73 3.55 3.00 3.14 2.86 2.43 
Combination 4.52 4.22 3.59 2.94 3.63 3.03 2.55 
 
The career team structure ranked best in four of seven criteria.  Volunteer teams were 
best at anticipating the unanticipated and at facing the least amount of resistance.  The 
combination structure was slightly higher than career teams in the category that measures 
benefits to the individuals and costs to the organization. 
Table 4 d. Number of Technicians. 
< 20 4.41 4.00 3.48 3.08 3.49 2.74 2.43 
21 - 40 4.55 4.28 3.78 3.12 3.49 3.18 2.75 
41 - 75 4.54 4.57 3.88 2.81 3.56 3.25 2.44 
>76 4.60 4.43 4.06 3.56 3.89 3.22 2.78 
   
The smaller teams with fewer than 20 technicians were best able to anticipate the 
unanticipated and at facing the least amount of resistance.  The largest teams, those with 
76 and more technicians, were best in four of seven criteria including:  implementation in 
relation to initial change goals, how well the program is established, how quickly the 
program evolved, and in providing benefits to the individuals and in keeping costs to the 
organization fair and equitable.  
Table 5 e. Member Orientation (Fire Service, Law Enforcement, Private Sector). 
Fire 4.54 4.38 3.84 3.12 3.62 3.08 2.62 
Public safety 4.32 3.70 3.14 3.14 3.57 2.86 3.14 
Industry 4.51 4.02 3.84 4.17 3.75 2.33 2.00 
Public/private 4.42 3.96 3.39 2.70 3.13 3.25 2.55 
 
The fire service scored highest in the first two criteria and industry scored best on the 
final four.  The two matched each other for best score on the criteria that evaluates how 
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well established, or institutionalized the program has become.   
Table 6  f. Single Organization Vs. Multiple Organization Teams 
Single 4.54 4.26 3.78 3.20 3.52 2.97 2.47 
Multiple 4.46 4.21 3.64 2.96 3.54 3.17 2.79 
 
Teams formed from a single organization produced better scores than those from multiple 
organizations.  Six of seven criteria were scored best for the single organization teams.  
And the seventh, evaluating costs to individuals and the organization, was nearly even.   
Table 7 g. How Long The Team Has Been In Existence 
0 - 3 years 4.47 4.17 3.64 2.60 3.35 3.30 2.90 
4 - 10 years 4.47 4.18 3.61 3.18 3.53 3.04 2.66 
11 years and over 4.55 4.33 3.88 3.11 3.58 3.02 2.47 
 
Another clear winner!  Teams that have been in existence for 11 years and over scored 
best in six of seven criteria.  Criteria four, which evaluates how rapidly the change was 
accomplished, yielded only slightly higher scores by the four to ten year old teams.    
Table 8 h. Who Manages/Coordinates The Team 
Fire Chief 4.54 4.37 3.81 3.02 3.55 3.08 2.55 
Sheriff 4.09 3.32 3.17 2.40 2.60 3.00 2.40 
Appointed 4.53 4.13 3.57 3.40 3.80 3.00 2.86 
Elected 4.17 3.49 3.41 3.25 3.00 3.50 3.00 
 
Teams managed or coordinated by a fire chief scored best in criteria one, two, and three.  
Criteria four and five were scored best by teams under the management or coordination 
of an appointed board, commission, or individual.  Criteria number seven, which 
evaluates initial resistance, received the best score by teams managed by a county sheriff 
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or other law enforcement designee.  The sheriff and the appointed manager/coordinator 
tied for best on the criteria that measures at how well teams anticipated the unanticipated. 
2.  For Midwest hazardous materials emergency response teams that provide 
service outside their normal jurisdiction, how is legal authority obtained? 
[ 60 ] mutual aid contracts 
[ 15 ] other contract language 
[ 23 ] local, state, or federal code provisions 
[ 11 ] N/A   
[  5  ] other . Inter-governmental agreements 
State contract (WI & MN) and a joint powers agreement 
     MABAS 
     Regional response team 
     Through billing the responsible party 
 
Survey respondents were allowed to check one box only.  The numbers represent the 
total for each method.  The responses tell us that 53% of hazardous materials response 
teams in the Midwest obtain legal authority to go outside their normal jurisdiction 
through mutual aid contracts, clearly the most common method.  Only 10% of all 
respondents do not provide service beyond their normal jurisdiction.  Twenty-three teams 
obtain legal authority through local, state, or federal code provisions and 15 others by 
other contract language.  Only five respondents indicated “other” methods of obtaining 
legal authority and those responses are indicated above. 
3.  How are Midwest hazardous materials emergency response teams funded? 
[ 79 ] taxation 
[ 22 ] special per capita assessment 
[ 54 ] fee for service 
[ 21 ] contract fees 
[ 12 ] other  State contracts (3) 
     Paid industrial team 
     State grants (2) 
     Private grants (2) 
     Hazardous substance fund 
     Donations (2) 
     DOD Air Force installation 
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For this question, respondents were allowed to check all that apply.  Because of that, the 
total is well beyond the 114 surveys returned.  Clearly, tax revenue and fee for service are 
the most mentioned sources of funding.  Special per capita assessments were identified 
22 times and contract fees 21 times as sources of funding.  Finally, there were 12 surveys 
returned with “other” funding sources identified.  Those other sources are listed above.      
Additional and Unexpected Findings 
In comparing the interval rankings of success criteria in combination queries, those that 
look at two questions at the same time, certain parings ceded results that merit review.  
From questions five and nine with best combination scores in all seven success criteria 
and a standard deviation of .18, 
Teams made up of all career members and have been in existence for 11 years and 
over.  
Table 9  Survey Query 1 
1 & 3 4.61 4.47 3.97 3.26 3.73 3.00 2.41 
 
From questions five and nine with best scores in all seven success criteria and a standard 
deviation of .17, 
Combination career/volunteer teams that have been in existence from four to ten years. 
Table 10 Survey Query 2 
3 & 2 4.57 4.35 3.62 3.10 3.88 2.85 2.45 
 
From questions seven and ten with best scores in all seven success criteria and a standard 
deviation of .55, 
Teams made up of fire service personnel only and are managed/coordinated by an 
appointed board, commission, or individual. 
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Table 11 Survey Query 3 
1 & 3 4.73 4.57 4.22 3.80 4.60 2.80 2.60 
 
  From questions five and seven with best scores in six of seven criteria and a standard 
deviation of .28, 
Combination career/volunteer teams made up of fire service personnel only. 
Table 12 Survey Query 4 
3 & 1 4.62 4.54 3.95 3.00 4.08 2.85 2.38 
 
From questions eight and nine with best scores in six of seven criteria and a standard 
deviation of .30, 
All team members come from one organization and the team has been in existence for 
eleven years and over. 
Table 13 Survey Query 5 
Yes - 3 4.70 4.53 4.01 3.33 3.69 2.92 2.04 
From questions eight and nine with best scores in five of seven criteria and a standard 
deviation of .36, 
All team members not from a single organization and the team has been in existence for 0 
- 3 years. 
Table 14 Survey Query 6 
No - 1 4.70 4.86 3.92 3.00 4.17 3.00 2.67 
Three responses from questions seven and nine with best scores in five of seven criteria 
with standard deviations of .23, .52, and .27 respectively,   
Fire service personnel only and in existence for 11 years and over. 
Table 15 Survey Query 7 
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1 and 3 4.65 4.63 4.04 3.10 3.77 3.10 2.38 
 
Combination public safety personnel and in existence for 0 - 3 years. 
Table 16 Survey Query 8 
3 and 1 4.78 5.00 3.88 3.00 4.50 3.00 2.00 
 
Combination public/private team personnel and in existence for 0 - 3 years. 
Table 17 Survey Query 9 
5 and 1 4.44 4.57 3.63 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 
 
Three responses from questions nine and ten with best scores in five of seven criteria 
with standard deviations of .27, .26, and .25, respectively, 
Teams 0 - 3 years old with an appointed board, commission, or individual to 
manage/coordinate. 
Table 18 Survey Query 10 
1 and 3 4.44 4.57 3.63 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 
 
Teams 4 - 10 years old with an appointed board, commission, or individual to 
manage/coordinate. 
Table 19 Survey Query 11 
2 and 3 4.64 4.43 3.53 3.44 4.00 2.89 2.67 
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Teams eleven years and older and with a fire chief to manage/coordinate. 
Table 20 Survey Query 12 
3 and 1 4.65 4.66 4.08 3.00 3.68 3.10 2.31 
 
From questions five and ten with best scores in five of seven criteria and a standard 
deviation of .27, 
Combination career/volunteer teams that are managed/coordinated by a fire chief. 
Table 21 Survey Query 13 
3 and 1 4.62 4.53 3.78 2.62 3.77 2.85 2.31 
 
And from questions one and ten with best scores in five of seven criteria and a standard 
deviation of .22, 
Regional response teams managed/coordinated by a fire chief. 
Table 22 Survey Query 14 
5 and 1 4.61 4.54 3.95 2.97 3.84 3.06 2.35 
 
 
The arithmetic mean for all responses is: 
Table 23 Survey Query 15 
4.50 4.24 3.72 3.10 3.53 3.05 2.60 
 
Survey response scores for our emergency response team (Eau Claire Fire Rescue 
Hazardous Materials Response Team) are: 
Table 24 Survey Query 16 
4.00 3.98 3.00 1.00 2.50 4.00 3.00 
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Eau Claire Fire Rescue Hazardous Materials Response Team scores reflect a standard 
deviation of 1.04. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Haz-mat tragedies, like the one in Kansas City, where six firefighters were killed when 
45,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate/fuel oil exploded and in Bhopal, India, where 2,500 
people died from a methyl isocyanate release from a Union Carbide plant have focused 
attention on hazardous materials and on proper procedures for mitigating an emergency.  
Federal laws with strict reporting and response criteria have evolved in their wake.  By 
law, local response agencies now receive worst case scenario information from local 
facilities to help them plan (Callan, 1994).  And federal monies to offset training costs 
are now becoming available.   
Another benefit of increased federal involvement in hazard mitigation is a clear 
understanding of what it means to be successful in this field.  The volumes of clearly 
articulated recommended practices (e.g., NFPA 471 & 472) and OHSA laws for 
emergency mitigation (29CFR1910.120) are explicit, precise, and quantifiable.  They 
have made it easier to develop evaluation tools and extract measurements of success.      
 “The evolution of regional hazardous materials response teams has provided fire 
departments with a reasonable, practical, and cost-effective solution to haz-mat response 
(Cashman, 1994, p. 66).”  Stories about successful regional teams were abundant in the 
literature review.  It seems that maximizing resources and minimizing duplication have 
driven the movement.  A regional team in Southern California found that together they 
could accomplish more than anyone could alone (Bryan, 1996).  Some of the regional 
configurations have been so successful that the framework is now extending to other 
services, such as confined space, multi-casualty incidents, bomb squads, and urban 
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search and rescue needs.  Oregon saw the benefits of regional teams and took early steps 
to institutionalize the change.   
 Survey results submit regional teams are enjoying success in the Midwest.  The 
criteria scores from research question 1(a.) indicate regional teams are more successful in 
every success criteria when compared to municipal and county-wide teams.  The solitary 
industry based team produced the best scores among the response options.  Regional and 
metro teams generated very similar scores of .11 and .15 standard deviations, 
respectively.  Their similarity in scores may reflect a similar response component.  
Chances are every metro team has had to negotiate and operate under written response 
agreements with metropolitan communities, similar to the multi-county regional teams.  
In a sense, metro teams could be thought of as regional teams that respond to an urban 
area only.  
 The literature also emphasized the importance of local emergency planning.  A 
community’s ability to cope with an emergency depends on its ability to plan for and 
respond to that incident (Moyer and Francis, 1994).  According to FEMA, a strong, 
centralized government entity, one that provides the majority of public services, 
including fire and police, will stand a better chance of producing a realistic response plan.  
“To exchange, share, and coordinate information across the multiplicity of independent 
fire and police departments without any real authority requires time, effort, energy, and 
patience (FEMA, 1993, pp. 30 & 31).”  Unfortunately, the role and strength of local 
emergency planning in haz-mat team success was not part of this research.  I suspect 
there is a direct correlation and believe the subject merits study.  
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 The research consistently demonstrated that smaller constitutes fewer 
unanticipated actions and less resistance to change.  No surprises here, whether in 
population served or the number of team technicians, size is the operative function.  It 
joins volunteer teams and those managed by Law Enforcement as best minimizing 
unanticipated actions and resistance to change.  Unfortunately, the same groups perform 
poorly in the remaining categories.   
 How long a team has been in existence provided some very interesting data.  In 
general, older teams enjoy more success.  However, when other variables are factored, 
we learn, for example, that combination career/volunteer, combination public/private, 
and combination public safety teams obtain their optimum scores much earlier.  It’s as if 
the combination teams peak early and then begin to wane, which makes me wonder what 
became of slow, steady improvement.  Is there a definite correlation between 
combination teams and a success curve that over time peaks early and then falls off?  The 
data suggests so.  Similarly, the data tells us that younger teams (0 - 10 years old) 
perform best when managed/coordinated by an appointed board, commission, or 
individual.  The older ones enjoy the most success when managed/coordinated by a Fire 
Chief.      
 From an organizational standpoint, our perception of problems and discord at the 
local level are verifiable by survey data.  The Eau Claire Fire Rescue Hazardous 
Materials Response Team survey results reflect a standard deviation of 1.04.  Those 
numbers are clearly too far removed from the mean and call for changes, which affords 
significant implications to our organization.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 From the research, it is possible to make recommendations based on results 
obtained in the findings.  For this research, the recommendations involve changing team 
structure and makeup of our hazardous materials response team.  The 1.04 standard 
deviation range in our program evaluation points to important shortcomings.  The survey 
evaluation should in no way discredit the talented individuals that make-up the team.  
Many have given selflessly over the years and hold a strong desire to transcend.  Yet, 
enduring problems with leadership and cost sharing join the immoderate fall from other 
Midwest team success levels in calling for change.  
 Some characteristics of team structure and makeup cannot be controlled.  How 
long the team has been in existence cannot be manipulated.  Other components, such as 
the number of technicians, require budget authority to modify.  And, changes in 
leadership or agency representation are extremely sensitive political issues that are 
seldom easy to predict, much less plan for. 
 Notwithstanding all of that, recommendations surfaced which call for revisions in 
all levels of how the team is composed and organized.  Geographical response boundaries 
are usually thought to be unalterable.  Regional haz-mat teams attenuate response 
boundaries by extending service coverage beyond normal jurisdiction through special 
agreements.  Contemporary literature was the driving force behind this recommendation.  
So much has been written on regional haz-mat teams and all of the literature speaks to 
their success.  The concept of service sharing and efficient use of resources is very 
current and extremely powerful with the taxpayer.  The study supports the 
recommendation by indicating program success will be improved by making the team 
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regional.  Furthermore, the study tells us larger populations and more technicians 
enhance program success.   Making the team regional should increase both population 
served and the number of team technicians. 
• The first recommendation then is to aggressively negotiate service agreements with 
adjoining counties to extend our service coverage and make our haz-mat team a 
regional response team. 
• The second recommendation involves the makeup of team personnel.  Survey data 
supports the effort to restrict membership to a single, career fire service organization.  
Three research ingredients are part of this recommendation:  Part one is to fill the 
team with all career employees.  Second, to restrict membership to fire service 
personnel only.  And third, to draw members from a single organization.  
Recommendation number two is to abridge team membership to Eau Claire Fire 
Rescue  personnel only. 
• The final recommendation involves who should manage/coordinate the team.  Survey 
data imparts little redeeming value in having a County Official as the 
manager/coordinator, and local sentiment would seem to support the data.  A much 
better structure, I believe, and one supported by the study would be to place 
management and coordination responsibilities with the Chief of Eau Claire Fire 
Rescue .      
 In summary, current literature and data from the study combine to support the 
following recommendations: 
1.  Create a regional response team.  Aggressively negotiate service agreements 
with neighboring counties.  
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2.  Limit team membership to Eau Claire Fire Rescue  personnel only. 
3.  Redirect management/coordination responsibilities to the Eau Claire Fire 
Chief. 
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Hazardous Materials Emergency 
Response Team Survey 
 
 
NOTE:  For the purpose of this research, a haz-mat team must possess a minimum Level 
“B” response capability (NFPA 471) and at minimum technician level responders 
(29CFR 1910.120, paragraph q).   
 
1)  Our haz-mat team routinely responds to hazardous spills: 
 
[  ] strictly within city or municipal boundaries 
[  ] to specific manufacturing/industrial site(s) only 
[  ] beyond our city boundary but within metropolitan area 
[  ] within the county 
[  ] to a multi-county or regional response area 
 
 
2)  If service is provided outside your jurisdiction, legal authority is granted through: 
 
[  ] mutual aid contracts 
[  ] other contract language 
[  ] local, state, or federal code provisions 
[  ] other  specify   ______________________________________________ 
[  ] N/A 
 
 
3)  Our team receives funds from: (check all that apply) 
 
[  ] taxation 
[  ] special per capita assessment 
[  ] fee for service 
[  ] contract fees 
[  ] other  specify   _______________________________________________________ 
  
 
4)  Population served: 
 
[  ] less than 50,000 
[  ] 50,000 to 100,000 
[  ] 100,000 to 500,000 
[  ] 500,000 to 1,000,000 
[  ] over 1,000,000 
 
5)  Describe the makeup of your team: 
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[  ] all career 
[  ] all volunteer 
[  ] combination 
 
 
6)  How many technicians: 
 
[  ] 20 or fewer 
[  ] 21 - 40 
[  ] 41 - 75 
[  ] 76 and over 
 
 
7)  Our team is made up of: 
 
[  ] fire service personnel only 
[  ] law enforcement personnel only 
[  ] combination public safety personnel 
[  ] private sector/industry based only 
[  ] combination public safety/private sector 
 
 
8)  All team members come from one organization: 
 
[  ] yes 
[  ] no  
 
 
9)  Our team has been in existence for: 
 
[  ] 0 - 3 years 
[  ] 4 - 10 years 
[  ] 11 years and over 
 
 
10) The team is managed/coordinated by: 
 
[  ] Fire Chief or designee 
[  ] County Sheriff or other law enforcement designee 
[  ] an appointed board, commission, or individual 
[  ] an elected board, commission, or individual 
 
 
11) A written emergency response plan is developed and implemented to handle 
 anticipated emergencies prior to the commencement of emergency response operations. 
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 Always true       Never true 
  
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
12) The senior emergency response official responding to an emergency becomes the 
individual in charge of a site-specific Incident Command System. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
13) To the extent possible, all hazardous substances or conditions present are identified   
and appropriate site analysis, maximum exposure limits, and hazardous substance 
handling procedures are identified. 
 Always true       Never true 
  
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
14) Based on the hazardous substances present, suitable steps are taken to assure personal 
protective equipment is appropriate for the hazards to be encountered. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
15) Team members engaged in emergency response and exposed to hazardous 
substances presenting an inhalation hazard or potential inhalation hazard wear positive 
pressure self-contained breathing apparatus while engaged in emergency response, until 
such time that the individual in charge determines that a decreased level of respiratory 
protection will not result in hazardous exposures. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
16) The individual in charge limits the number of emergency response personnel at the 
emergency site, in those areas of potential or actual exposure to incident or site hazards, 
to those who are actively performing emergency operations.  And, operations in 
hazardous areas is performed using the buddy system in groups of two or more. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
 
17) Back-up personnel stand by with equipment ready to provide assistance or rescue. 
Advance first aid support personnel also stand by with medical equipment and 
transportation capability. 
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 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
18) The individual in charge designates a safety official, who is knowledgeable in the 
operations being implemented at the emergency response site, with specific responsibility 
to identify and evaluate hazard and to provide direction with respect to the safety of 
operations for the emergency at hand. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
19) When activities are judged by the safety official to be an IDLH condition and/or to 
involve an imminent danger condition, the safety official has authority to alter, suspend, 
or terminate those activities. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
20) The incident management system includes a standard personnel identification 
system to maintain accountability for each member engaged in activities at an incident 
scene. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
21) The incident management system includes a standard operating procedure to evacuate 
personnel from an area where an imminent hazard condition is found to exist and account 
for the safety of personnel.  The system includes a method to immediately notify all 
personnel in the affected area of an imminent hazard condition by means of audible 
warning devices. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
22) Provisions for rest and rehabilitation include medical evaluation and treatment, 
food and fluid replenishment, and relief from extreme climatic conditions. 
Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
23) A debriefing is held for those involved in decontamination as soon as practical. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
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24) Pre and post-entry medical monitoring is performed on all individuals wearing 
chemical liquid splash-and vapor-protective clothing and performing hazardous materials 
operations. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
25) Our team management system includes comprehensive standard operating 
procedures for: 
 
 (check all  those for which a standard operating procedure exists) 
 
[  ] Incident Response – How will the team be notified?  How will it get there?  What 
is its expected role? 
 
[  ] Control Zones – What criteria establishes the hot, cold and warm zone so as to 
isolate the incident and protect others? 
 
[  ] Hazard and Risk Assessment – How will the product be identified, the identity 
confirmed?  What resources will be used for hazard assessment? 
 
[  ]   Monitoring Instruments – What type to use?  How often are the instruments 
recalibrated?  How are they to be used? 
 
[  ] Incident Command – Who is in charge of the team and the incident?  Who has the 
authority to call for outside assistance?  What federal, state, and local requirements are 
there for reporting the incident? 
 
[  ] Safety Officer – Who?  What is his/her authority?  What is that person’s role? 
 
[  ] Personal Protective Equipment – What is available?  How is it to be selected and 
maintained?  What limits can be anticipated? 
 
[  ] Decontamination – What will be needed?  Who is responsible for doing it?  What 
is to be done with equipment that cannot be decontaminated?  When must it be set up?  
What is acceptable minimum emergency decontamination? 
 
[  ] Site Entry – How many people will enter?  Who will be the backup team?  What 
must be done before the site entry is attempted? 
 
[  ] Control and Confinement – What equipment is available?  How is it to be used?  
Are there special considerations such as floor drains, parking lot runoff or the reactivity 
of the containment material with certain products on-site? 
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[  ] Termination and Record Keeping Procedures – the how, what, when, and where 
of an incident.  Essential recorded information for exposure records, operation critique 
and future reference. 
 
[  ] Medical Surveillance – Medical surveillance requirements for pre- and post-entry 
as well as a protocol for having medical assistance available. 
 
[  ]  Training – Requisite hours and competencies for both certification and annual 
recertification. 
 
 
26) As a guide in decision making, action guides or decision trees (checklists) have  
been developed for use by our team. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
27) As outlined in NFPA 472, Chapter 7, hazardous materials Branch Officer 
competencies are being used by our team. 
   Yes    No 
   [  ]    [  ] 
 
 
28) The hazardous materials emergency plan is reviewed and updated annually. 
   Yes    No 
   [  ]    [  ] 
 
 
29) A training exercise is conducted annually to determine the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the hazardous materials emergency plan. 
   Yes    No 
   [  ]    [  ] 
 
 
30) All monitoring equipment is operationally checked prior to use and periodically 
calibrated in accordance with manufacturers’ specifications. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
 
 
31) Training and recertification programs address competencies as well as required 
hours. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
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32) Radio frequencies are “dedicated” and not shared with other agencies. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
33) Pre-planning emergency response to fixed site and transportation spills is a routine 
and established activity for our team. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
34) Coordination with outside agencies includes detailed resource information and 
methods for sharing. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
35) Our team regularly reviews MSDS Sara Title III information. 
 Always true       Never true 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
36) The pace of a teams’ inception and formation is influenced by local circumstances 
and by a sense of urgency.  Characterize how quickly the process unfolded in the 
formation and development of your team. 
 Rapid        Slow 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
37) The economic costs of developing and maintaining our hazardous materials 
response team have been fairly and equitably shared. 
 Strongly agree       Strongly disagree 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
38) Members of the organization(s) affected by haz-mat consider, on a personal level, the 
program to be more of a benefit than a burden. 
 Benefit        Burden 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
39) Program development and implementation bring certain unanticipated actions and 
developments.  Did the implementation of your haz-mat team yield a high or low number 
of unanticipated actions and occurrences? 
 High number       Low number 
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 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
40) The last question looks at initial resistance to implementing your haz-mat team. 
Whether from a lack of understanding or acceptance of the change, would you 
characterize the number of resistance efforts (efforts to maintain the status quo) as high 
or low? 
 High number       Low number 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
 
 
 
 
Your input is vitally important.  Please return the completed survey in the enclosed 
postage paid envelope.   
 
 
 
Thank you again for your cooperation and valuable time.  
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         December 3, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Haz-Mat team leader: 
 
I am in the process of gathering data about hazardous materials response teams in the 
Midwest.  The information will be used to support a research project I am completing for 
my Masters Program at the University of Wisconsin - Stout.  I would appreciate your 
cooperation and sincere efforts to help me understand the relationship between team 
structure and development by completing and returning the enclosed survey.   
 
The study is conducted anonymously with only team size and makeup questions that are 
necessary to analyze the results.  The instructions are simple: merely indicate your 
response by marking the appropriate box or numbered reply.  Insert the completed 
document in the postage paid envelope and place it in the mail.  
 
The survey will take about 10 minutes to complete.  I know your time is valuable.  But 
please do not overlook the importance of your contribution.  In order to evaluate 
effectively and assure confidence in the results, you participation is crucial.  
 
Please complete and return the survey by Friday, December 19.  If you desire, I will be 
happy to share the results of the survey.   
 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Edward Kassing 
Deputy Chief of Operations 
Eau Claire Fire Rescue  
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NUMERICAL SUMMARY 
 
Questions 1 – 10  
 
1)  Our haz-mat team routinely responds to hazardous spills: 
 
[ 17 ] strictly within city or municipal boundaries 
[  1  ] to specific manufacturing/industrial site(s) only 
[ 19 ] beyond our city boundary but within metropolitan area 
[ 23 ] within the county 
[ 54 ] to a multi-county or regional response area 
 
 
2)  If service is provided outside your jurisdiction, legal authority is granted through: 
 
[ 60 ] mutual aid contracts 
[ 15 ] other contract language 
[ 23 ] local, state, or federal code provisions 
[ 11 ] N/A   
[  5  ] other . . . . Inter-governmental agreements 
      State contract (WI & MN) and a joint powers agreement 
      MABAS 
      Regional response team 
      Through billing the responsible party 
 
3)  Our team receives funds from: (check all that apply) 
 
[ 79 ] taxation 
[ 22 ] special per capita assessment 
[ 54 ] fee for service 
[ 21 ] contract fees 
[ 10 ] other  . . . State contracts (3) 
      Paid industrial team 
      State grants (2) 
      Private grants (2) 
      Hazardous substance fund 
      Donations (2) 
      DOD Air Force installation   
 
4)  Population served: 
 
[ 25 ] less than 50,000 
[ 20 ] 50,000 to 100,000 
[ 46 ] 100,000 to 500,000 
[ 15 ] 500,000 to 1,000,000 
[  8  ] over 1,000,000 
5)  Describe the makeup of your team: 
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[ 76 ] all career 
[  7  ] all volunteer 
[ 31 ] combination 
 
 
6)  How many technicians: 
 
[ 37 ] 20 or fewer 
[ 51 ] 21 - 40 
[ 17 ] 41 - 75 
[  9  ] 76 and over 
 
 
7)  Our team is made up of: 
 
[ 79 ] fire service personnel only 
[  0  ] law enforcement personnel only 
[  7  ] combination public safety personnel 
[  8  ] private sector/industry based only 
[ 20 ] combination public safety/private sector 
 
 
8)  All team members come from one organization: 
 
[ 67 ] yes 
[ 47 ] no  
 
 
9)  Our team has been in existence for: 
 
[ 11 ] 0 - 3 years 
[ 57 ] 4 - 10 years 
[ 46 ] 11 years and over 
 
 
10) The team is managed/coordinated by: 
 
[ 81 ] Fire Chief or designee 
[  5  ] County Sheriff or other law enforcement designee 
[ 21 ] an appointed board, commission, or individual 
[  4  ] an elected board, commission, or individual 
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Seven of Eight & Eight of Eight* Success Criteria 
 
(1 and 9)  Metro team in existence for 11 years and over . 
 
(1 and 8)  Municipal team from one organization.   
County team from one organization.   
Regional team from one organization. 
 
(1 and 7)  County team that is made up of a combination of public safety personnel. 
 
(1 and 5)  County team that is a combination of career and volunteer. 
 
(8 and 9)  All members from one organization and in existence for 11 years and over.   
All members not from one organization and in existence for 0 - 3 years. 
 
(7 and 10)  *Fire service personnel only and managed/coordinated by an appointed 
board, commission, or individual. 
 
(6 and 9)  Twenty or fewer technicians and in existence for 11 years and over.   
Forty one to 75 technicians and in existence from 4 to 10 years.   
Seventy six and over technicians and in existence from 4 to 10 years. 
 
(6 and 8)  Twenty or fewer technicians and all members from one organization.   
Twenty one to 40 technicians and all members from one organization.   
Forty one to 75 technicians and all members from one organization. 
 
(6 and 7)  Forty one to 75 technicians made up of fire service personnel only. 
 
(6 and 10)  Forty one to 75 technicians managed/coordinated by Fire Chief. 
 
(5 and 7)  Combination of career/volunteer made up of fire service personnel only. 
 
(4 and 6)  Population served less than 50,000 with 21 - 40 technicians. 
 
(4 and 5)  Population served of over 1,000,000 with a combination of career/volunteer 
members. 
 
(5 and 9)  *All career team in existence for 11 years and over.   
*Combination career/volunteer team in existence from 4 - 10 years. 
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Six of Eight Success Criteria 
(1 and 6)  County team and 41 - 75 technicians. 
 
(1 and 4)  County team serving 50,000 to 100,000 people. 
 
(1 and 10)  Regional team managed/coordinated by Fire Chief. 
 
(9 and 10)  Team 0 - 3 years old with an appointed board, commission, or individual to 
manage/coordinate.   
 
Team 4 - 10 years old with an appointed board, commission, or individual to 
manage/coordinate.   
 
Teams 11 years and older with a Fire Chief to manage/coordinate. 
 
(7 and 9)  Fire service personnel only and in existence for 11 years and over. 
Combination public safety personnel team in existence for 0 - 3 years. 
Industry based team in existence for 11 years and over. 
Combination public/private sector members in existence for 0 - 3 years. 
 
(6 and 9)  Twenty one to 40 technicians in existence for 0 - 3 years. 
 
(6 and 8)  Seventy six and more technicians with all members not coming from the same 
organization. 
 
(6 and 7)  Twenty or fewer technicians that are industry based. 
Seventy six and more technicians made up of fire service personnel only. 
 
(6 and 10)  Twenty one to 40 technicians managed/coordinated by an appointed board, 
commission, or individual. 
 
(5 and 8)  All volunteer team with members coming from one organization. 
 
(5 and 7)  All career team that is industry based. 
(5 and 6)  Combination career/volunteer team with 76 and more technicians. 
 
(5 and 10)  Combination career/volunteer team that is managed/coordinated by Fire 
Chief. 
 
(4 and 6)  50 to 100,000 population with 41 to 75 technicians. 
100 to 500,000 population with 76 and more technicians. 
 
(4 and 5)  50 to 100,000 population with a combination career/volunteer team. 
100 to 500,000 population with an all career team. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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         January 20, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Haz-Mat Team Leader: 
 
 Last December you completed a survey questionnaire for an applied research 
project for my Master program requirements.  Entitled, “Team Structure Evaluation of 
Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Teams in the Midwest,” the purpose of the 
research was to evaluate structure and configuration components of hazardous materials 
response teams, here in the Midwest.   
 
 Your survey response announced a desire to inspect the results.  Enclosed with 
this letter are two appendices that condense the data.  The “Numerical Summary, 
Questions 1- 10” attachment, shows how many teams were represented in eight 
categories of inquiry.  The “Team Structure Components with Success Criteria in Interval 
Scales” attachment, summarizes the evaluation aspect of the research by projecting a 
point score to seven different success criteria.  Although it sounds confusing its really 
not.  
 
 I hope you find the information as interesting as I found the discovery to be.  If 
your appetite longs for more detail, the entire document should be available shortly 
through the Learning Resource Center at the NFA.   
 
 Thanks for helping with the research.  I appreciate the time you gave to 
completing the survey and hope I can return the favor some day.  
 
      Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
      Edward A. Kassing 
Deputy Chief of Operations 
Eau Claire Fire Rescue   
 
Enclosures:  2       
 
